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Young	   children	   learn	   from	   others’	   examples,	   and	   do	   so	  selectively.	   Here	   we	   examine	   whether	   the	   efficacy	   of	   prior	  experience	   influences	   children’s	   tendency	   to	   imitate.	   36-­‐month-­‐olds	   received	   prior	   experience	   on	   a	   causal	   learning	  task.	   The	   children	   either	   performed	   the	   task	   themselves	   or	  watched	  an	  adult	  perform	  it.	  The	  nature	  of	  the	  experience	  was	  systematically	  manipulated	   such	   that	   the	   actor	   had	   either	   an	  easy	   or	   a	   difficult	   experience	   solving	   the	   task.	  Next,	   a	   second	  adult	   demonstrated	   an	   innovative	   technique	   for	   solving	   the	  task.	   Children	  who	  had	  a	  difficult	   first-­‐person	  experience	   and	  those	   who	   had	   witnessed	   another	   person	   having	   a	   difficult	  time	   were	   significantly	   more	   likely	   to	   adopt	   and	   imitate	   the	  adult’s	   innovation	   than	   those	   who	   had	   or	   witnessed	   an	   easy	  experience.	  Overall,	  children	  who	  observed	  another	  were	  even	  more	  likely	  to	  imitate	  than	  were	  those	  whose	  prior	  experience	  consisted	   of	   their	   own	   hands-­‐on	   motor	   behavior,	   confirming	  that	   imitation	   is	   influenced	   by	   both	   own	   and	   others'	   prior	  experience.	  	  	  Preschoolers	  are	  adept	  at	  imitative	  learning	  (e.g.,	  Barr	  &	  Hayne,	  2000;	  Carpenter,	  Call	  &	  Tomasello,	  2002;	  Meltzoff,	  Kuhl,	  Movellan,	  &	  Sejnowski,	  2009;	  Meltzoff	  &	  Williamson,	  2010;	  Subiaul,	  Romansky,	  Klein,	  Holmes,	  &	  Terrence,	  2007;	  Williamson,	  Jaswal,	  &	  Meltzoff,	  2010).	  They	  can	  imitate	  many	  components	  of	  others’	  behaviors,	  including	  the	  model’s	  goal	  or	  intention,	  the	  outcome	  produced	  by	  the	  acts,	  and	  the	  specific	  means	  used	  to	  attain	  those	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outcomes	  (e.g.,	  Carpenter	  &	  Call,	  2002;	  Call	  &	  Carpenter,	  2002;	  Want	  &	  Harris,	  2002).	  The	  current	  research	  investigates	  factors	  that	  may	  regulate	  children’s	  imitation	  of	  another’s	  means.	  Two	  key	  factors	  are	  systematically	  manipulated.	  First,	  we	  examine	  whether	  36-­‐month-­‐olds	  vary	  their	  imitation	  of	  means	  depending	  on	  the	  efficacy	  of	  those	  means.	  Second,	  we	  examine	  whether	  children’s	  prior	  experience	  influences	  imitation,	  specifically	  whether	  children	  take	  into	  account	  both	  their	  own	  prior	  hands-­‐on	  motor	  experience	  (doing	  the	  act)	  as	  well	  as	  the	  experience	  of	  observing	  the	  efficacy	  of	  the	  acts	  of	  others	  (watching	  the	  act	  being	  done).	  Imitation	  exerts	  a	  powerful	  pull	  on	  preschoolers.	  Under	  certain	  conditions,	  they	  imitate	  acts	  that	  are	  not	  causally	  necessary	  for	  completing	  a	  task,	  often	  called	  “over-­‐imitation”	  (e.g.,	  Horner	  &	  Whiten,	  2005;	  Lyons,	  Young,	  &	  Keil,	  2007;	  McGuigan,	  Whiten,	  Flynn,	  &	  Horner,	  2007;	  Nielsen	  &	  Tomaselli,	  2010).	  Horner	  and	  Whiten	  found	  that	  after	  seeing	  an	  adult	  perform	  a	  non-­‐functional	  act	  as	  a	  means	  to	  obtain	  a	  reward,	  3-­‐	  and	  4-­‐year-­‐olds	  usually	  produced	  this	  unnecessary	  act;	  and	  in	  contrast,	  chimpanzees	  skipped	  the	  act	  when	  they	  could	  see	  that	  it	  was	  not	  causally	  necessary	  for	  obtaining	  the	  reward.	  The	  tendency	  to	  imitate	  unnecessary	  acts	  in	  certain	  situations	  persists	  in	  school-­‐aged	  children	  (McGuigan	  et	  al.,	  2007)	  and	  adults	  (McGuigan,	  Makinson,	  &	  Whiten,	  in	  press).	  Even	  though	  children	  sometimes	  copy	  ineffective	  acts,	  a	  growing	  body	  of	  research	  indicates	  that	  their	  imitation	  is	  not	  rote,	  automatic,	  or	  compulsory	  but	  rather	  is	  flexibly	  regulated	  depending	  on	  context	  and	  usefulness	  of	  the	  example.	  Children	  can	  selectively	  choose	  what,	  when,	  and	  whom	  to	  imitate	  (Meltzoff	  et	  al.,	  2009).	  For	  example,	  infants	  and	  toddlers	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  imitate	  acts	  that	  are	  involved	  in	  producing	  outcomes	  than	  those	  that	  are	  not	  (Barr	  &	  Hayne,	  1996;	  Bauer,	  1992;	  Brugger,	  Lariviere,	  Mumme,	  &	  Bushnell,	  2007;	  Hauf,	  Elsner,	  &	  Aschersleben,	  2004)	  and	  children	  ages	  12	  months	  to	  4	  years	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  reproduce	  the	  outcomes	  (e.g.,	  touching	  a	  particular	  spot),	  than	  the	  specific	  motor	  movements	  used	  to	  reach	  those	  outcomes	  (e.g.,	  the	  particular	  type	  of	  reach	  used	  to	  touch	  the	  spot)	  (Bekkering,	  Wohlschläger,	  &	  Gattis,	  2000;	  Carpenter,	  Call,	  &	  Tomasello,	  2005;	  Gleissner,	  Meltzoff,	  &	  Bekkering,	  2000;	  Wagner,	  Yocom,	  &	  Greene-­‐Havas,	  2008;	  Williamson	  &	  Markman,	  2006).	  	  Imitation	  is	  also	  regulated	  by	  social	  context.	  Toddlers	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  imitate	  socially-­‐available	  adults	  (Brugger	  et	  al.,	  2007;	  Nielsen,	  2006;	  Nielsen,	  Simcock,	  &	  Jenkins,	  2008)	  and	  to	  duplicate	  intentional	  rather	  than	  accidental	  acts	  that	  produce	  an	  outcome	  (Carpenter,	  Akhtar,	  &	  Tomasello,	  1998).	  Two-­‐year-­‐olds	  preferentially	  also	  imitate	  causal	  outcomes	  when	  these	  are	  brought	  about	  by	  a	  person	  versus	  seeing	  the	  same	  cause-­‐effect	  relation	  occur	  “naturally”	  through	  object	  interplay	  with	  no	  human	  intervention	  (Bonawitz,	  et	  al.,	  2010).	  Although	  children	  have	  been	  shown	  to	  learn	  behaviors	  when	  no	  actor	  is	  shown,	  (e.g.,	  Thompson	  &	  Russell,	  2004;	  Tennie,	  Call,	  &	  Tomasello,	  2006;	  Hopper,	  Lambeth,	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Schapiro,	  &	  Whiten,	  2008)	  the	  presence	  of	  an	  actor	  seems	  to	  be	  beneficial	  when	  children	  are	  learning	  and	  imitating	  complex	  acts	  (Hopper,	  Flynn,	  Wood,	  &	  Whiten,	  2010;	  Meltzoff,	  2007,	  experiment	  3).	  Young	  children	  will	  also	  learn	  from	  unsuccessful	  efforts	  to	  reach	  a	  goal.	  Meltzoff	  (1995)	  found	  that	  18-­‐month-­‐olds	  could	  infer	  and	  reproduce	  an	  adult’s	  intentions	  from	  an	  unsuccessful	  demonstration.	  For	  example,	  after	  watching	  an	  adult	  try	  to	  separate	  a	  barbell-­‐shaped	  object	  unsuccessfully	  (his	  hands	  slipped	  off	  the	  ends),	  children	  did	  not	  reproduce	  the	  exact	  movements	  by	  slipping	  their	  fingers	  from	  the	  side	  of	  the	  object.	  Instead,	  the	  children	  reproduced	  what	  they	  perceived	  to	  be	  the	  model’s	  goal	  or	  intention	  by	  wrapping	  their	  fingers	  firmly	  around	  the	  sides	  and	  yanking	  the	  object	  apart.	  This	  ability	  to	  enact	  other’s	  intended	  acts	  when	  an	  unseen	  goal	  must	  be	  inferred	  from	  a	  pattern	  of	  actions	  seems	  to	  emerge	  early	  in	  the	  second	  year	  of	  life	  (Bellagamba	  &	  Tomasello,	  1999;	  Meltzoff,	  2007,	  experiment	  2;	  Nielsen,	  2009).	  Children	  have	  also	  been	  shown	  to	  derive	  special	  benefit	  from	  demonstrations	  that	  directly	  contrast	  effective	  and	  ineffective	  techniques	  (Want	  &	  Harris,	  2001;	  Nielsen,	  2006).	  For	  example,	  Nielsen	  found	  that	  12-­‐month-­‐olds	  were	  more	  likely	  to	  imitate	  the	  use	  of	  a	  tool	  after	  seeing	  an	  ineffective	  demonstration	  that	  did	  not	  use	  one.	  	  In	  order	  to	  more	  fully	  flesh	  out	  factors	  that	  regulate	  when	  and	  what	  children	  imitate,	  it	  is	  also	  important	  to	  consider	  the	  case	  in	  which	  two	  acts	  are	  both	  effective	  in	  reaching	  a	  goal	  but	  one	  is	  more	  efficient	  than	  another.	  Cues	  such	  as	  the	  amount	  of	  effort	  needed	  would	  indicate	  which	  is	  the	  more	  efficacious	  approach.	  Selectively	  choosing	  techniques	  that	  are	  shown	  to	  be	  relatively	  more	  effective	  is	  a	  powerful	  way	  to	  capitalize	  on	  social	  learning	  (Laland,	  2004).	  There	  is	  some	  evidence	  that	  2-­‐	  to	  3-­‐year-­‐olds	  will	  use	  such	  efficacy	  as	  a	  guide	  to	  choosing	  what	  and	  when	  to	  imitate	  (Harnick,	  1978;	  Williamson,	  Meltzoff,	  &	  Markman,	  2008).	  Williamson	  et	  al.	  (2008)	  gave	  3-­‐year-­‐olds	  an	  initial	  experience	  completing	  a	  task,	  such	  as	  opening	  a	  drawer	  to	  retrieve	  a	  toy.	  For	  half	  of	  the	  children,	  the	  drawer	  was	  difficult	  to	  pull	  out	  and	  for	  the	  other	  half	  it	  was	  easy	  —	  though	  all	  children	  in	  both	  groups	  fully	  succeeded	  in	  accomplishing	  the	  task.	  Following	  this	  differential	  self-­‐experience,	  all	  children	  then	  saw	  an	  adult	  demonstrate	  an	  innovate	  technique	  for	  solving	  the	  task.	  Results	  showed	  that	  those	  children	  with	  the	  difficult	  motor	  experience	  were	  significantly	  more	  likely	  to	  adopt	  the	  novel	  means	  shown	  by	  the	  adult.	  	  The	  current	  study	  extends	  this	  finding	  by	  testing	  whether	  first-­‐person	  motor	  experience	  is	  necessary	  for	  this	  effect.	  Several	  researchers	  have	  suggested	  that	  self-­‐experiences	  play	  an	  important	  role	  in	  shaping	  children’s	  social	  and	  causal	  understanding	  (e.g.,	  Meltzoff	  &	  Brooks,	  2008;	  Tomasello,	  1999;	  Woodward,	  Sommerville,	  Gerson,	  Henderson,	  &	  Buresch,	  2009).	  For	  example,	  giving	  10-­‐month-­‐olds	  hands-­‐on	  experiences	  with	  means-­‐ends	  sequences	  changed	  infants’	  goal	  understanding,	  as	  measured	  by	  a	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looking-­‐time	  paradigm	  (Sommerville	  &	  Woodward,	  2005).	  However,	  in	  addition	  to	  their	  own	  self-­‐generated	  experiences,	  it	  is	  possible	  that	  young	  children	  may	  be	  able	  to	  use	  others’	  experiences	  with	  a	  task—information	  about	  efficacy	  picked	  up	  simply	  by	  observing	  others,	  not	  acting	  themselves	  (see	  Marshall	  &	  Meltzoff,	  2011,	  for	  relevant	  developmental	  neuroscience	  work).	  This	  capacity	  would	  improve	  the	  selectivity,	  usefulness,	  and	  power	  of	  social	  learning	  and	  imitation.	  	  The	  current	  study	  explores	  how	  children	  make	  use	  of	  efficacy	  information	  provided	  by	  the	  acts	  of	  self	  and	  other.	  Specifically,	  we	  investigate	  whether	  witnessing	  another	  person	  having	  an	  easy	  or	  difficult	  experience	  –	  prior	  to	  and	  without	  engaging	  in	  the	  task	  oneself	  –	  influences	  the	  imitation	  of	  the	  other’s	  innovative	  technique.	  	  
1.	  Method	  Two	  factors	  were	  systematically	  manipulated:	  person	  performing	  the	  act	  (self	  versus	  other)	  and	  nature	  of	  prior	  experience	  (ease	  versus	  difficulty	  in	  achieving	  the	  goal).	  The	  hypothesis	  is	  that	  children	  will	  subsequently	  be	  more	  likely	  to	  imitate	  the	  distinctive	  act	  demonstrated	  by	  an	  adult	  if	  prior	  experience	  indicates	  that	  the	  goal	  is	  difficult	  to	  achieve—whether	  that	  experience	  is	  gained	  through	  first-­‐person	  (one’s	  own	  acts)	  or	  third-­‐person	  (observation	  of	  others’	  acts)	  channels.	  	  
1.1	  Participants	  The	  participants	  were	  80	  children	  (35-­‐36	  months	  old,	  M	  =35.9;	  42	  males),	  recruited	  by	  telephone	  through	  a	  University’s	  child	  participant	  list.	  According	  to	  parental	  report,	  the	  racial	  composition	  of	  the	  sample	  was	  76.25%	  white,	  3.75%	  Hispanic,	  2.5%	  Asian,	  1.25%	  Hawaiian/Pacific	  Islander,	  7.5%	  mixed	  race,	  and	  8.75%	  other/unknown.	  Direct	  measures	  of	  socioeconomic	  status	  were	  not	  obtained,	  but	  the	  sample	  was	  generally	  middle-­‐	  to	  upper-­‐middle	  class.	  Two	  additional	  children’s	  data	  were	  excluded	  due	  to	  experimenter	  error.	  	  
1.2	  Materials	  Two	  sets	  of	  stimuli	  were	  used,	  one	  on	  each	  of	  two	  trials.	  Both	  sets	  consisted	  of	  three	  containers,	  each	  with	  a	  small	  toy	  inside	  (see	  Figure	  1).	  The	  two	  sets	  of	  were	  visually	  distinct	  and	  differed	  in	  size,	  shape,	  and	  color	  from	  each	  other.	  All	  of	  the	  containers	  within	  each	  set	  were	  identical.	  One	  set	  of	  stimuli	  consisted	  of	  three,	  blue	  plastic	  boxes	  (20	  x	  6	  x	  17	  cm),	  each	  of	  which	  had	  a	  small	  black	  sliding	  switch	  (nonfunctional)	  in	  the	  upper	  corner	  of	  the	  top	  surface.	  The	  second	  set	  of	  stimuli	  consisted	  of	  three	  red,	  stacked	  drawers	  (21	  x	  16	  x	  17	  cm),	  each	  of	  which	  had	  a	  (nonfunctional)	  toggle	  lever	  on	  the	  right	  side	  of	  each	  drawer.	  The	  first	  container	  in	  each	  stimulus	  set	  had	  a	  hidden	  mechanism	  that,	  when	  engaged,	  increased	  resistance	  and	  made	  it	  difficult	  (but	  not	  impossible)	  to	  open.	  
1.3	  Design	  and	  Procedure	  In	  all	  groups,	  two	  experimenters	  (E1	  and	  E2)	  sat	  at	  a	  small	  table	  with	  the	  child	  in	  a	  quiet	  laboratory	  room	  in	  a	  university	  setting.	  The	  three	  boxes	  or	  drawers	  were	  placed	  in	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Figure	  1.	  The	  box	  stimuli	  (A)	  and	  the	  drawer	  stimuli	  (B).	  For	  the	  box	  stimuli	  an	  aerial	  view	  is	  provided	  to	  show	  the	  three	  containers;	  for	  the	  drawer	  stimuli	  the	  three	  containers	  were	  vertically	  stacked,	  as	  shown.	  For	  the	  box	  stimuli,	  the	  act	  demonstrated	  by	  E1	  was	  sliding	  the	  switch	  on	  the	  second	  box	  (shown	  in	  A)	  and	  opening	  the	  box	  easily.	  For	  the	  drawer	  stimuli,	  E1	  flipped	  the	  second	  toggle	  (shown	  in	  B)	  and	  opened	  the	  corresponding	  drawer	  easily.	  For	  the	  boxes,	  the	  far	  left	  box	  was	  used	  for	  the	  initial	  experience	  (Phase	  1),	  the	  middle	  box	  for	  the	  demonstration	  (Phase	  2),	  and	  the	  box	  on	  the	  right	  for	  test	  to	  assess	  the	  children’s	  imitation	  (Phase	  3).	  For	  the	  drawers,	  the	  top	  drawer	  was	  used	  for	  the	  initial	  experience,	  the	  middle	  drawer	  for	  the	  demonstration,	  and	  the	  bottom	  drawer	  for	  the	  test.	  	  We	  crossed	  two	  independent	  factors	  –	  person	  (self	  /	  other)	  and	  experience	  (easy	  /	  difficult).	  Participants	  were	  randomly	  assigned	  to	  one	  of	  four	  independent	  groups.	  These	  groups	  varied	  in	  their	  experience	  on	  the	  first	  container	  before	  they	  saw	  the	  adult’s	  innovative	  solution:	  Self-­‐easy,	  self-­‐difficult,	  other-­‐easy,	  and	  other-­‐difficult.	  
1.3.1	  Initial	  experience:	  Phase	  1.	  The	  initial	  experience	  varied	  as	  a	  function	  of	  group	  and	  constituted	  the	  experimental	  manipulation.	  In	  the	  difficult	  groups,	  the	  first	  box	  (or	  drawer)	  in	  each	  set	  were	  had	  added	  resistance	  so	  that	  they	  were	  difficult	  to	  open,	  while	  in	  the	  easy	  groups	  the	  box	  lid	  (or	  drawer)	  moved	  freely	  and	  was	  therefore	  easy	  to	  open.	  In	  the	  self-­‐experience	  groups,	  E1	  directed	  the	  children	  to	  open	  the	  first	  container.	  In	  the	  other-­‐experience	  groups,	  E1	  told	  the	  children	  that	  E2	  would	  open	  the	  first	  drawer	  or	  box,	  and	  E2	  did	  not	  act	  until	  the	  children	  were	  watching.	  E2’s	  behavior	  was	  carefully	  scripted	  to	  illustrate	  either	  an	  easy	  or	  difficult	  experience.	  When	  having	  an	  easy	  experience,	  
E2	  simply	  opened	  the	  box	  or	  drawer	  and	  gave	  the	  toy	  that	  was	  inside	  to	  the	  child	  to	  play	  with.	  When	  having	  a	  difficult	  experience,	  E2	  pulled	  at	  the	  container,	  paused	  when	  it	  met	  with	  resistance	  and	  would	  not	  open,	  commented	  on	  the	  difficulty	  and	  then	  yanked	  harder	  so	  as	  to	  pull	  the	  container	  open.	  In	  all	  cases	  in	  all	  groups,	  when	  the	  first	  container	  was	  successfully	  opened	  to	  reveal	  the	  toy,	  E2	  labeled	  the	  object	  (e.g.	  “Look,	  it’s	  the	  pig”).	  When	  the	  child	  was	  finished	  playing	  with	  the	  toy	  it	  was	  returned	  and	  the	  drawer	  or	  box	  closed	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before	  moving	  on	  to	  the	  next	  phase.	  Phase	  1	  provided	  the	  initial	  experience,	  or	  back	  drop,	  for	  the	  novel	  act	  demonstration,	  which	  came	  in	  Phase	  2.	  	  
1.3.2	  Demonstration:	  Phase	  2.	  The	  demonstration	  was	  held	  constant	  across	  all	  groups.	  After	  children	  were	  given	  the	  prior	  experience	  (see	  four	  groups	  described	  above),	  all	  children	  observed	  the	  same	  demonstration.	  For	  the	  demonstration	  period,	  E1	  drew	  the	  children’s	  attention	  (“It’s	  my	  turn	  now,	  watch”)	  and	  acted	  only	  when	  the	  child	  was	  watching.	  E1	  produced	  a	  distinctive	  means	  (the	  target	  act)	  before	  easily	  opening	  the	  second	  container	  in	  the	  set	  of	  three.	  More	  specifically,	  for	  the	  box	  stimuli,	  she	  slid	  a	  switch	  on	  the	  top	  surface	  of	  the	  box	  and	  then	  easily	  opened	  it;	  and	  for	  the	  drawer,	  she	  flipped	  a	  toggle	  lever	  that	  was	  located	  on	  the	  side	  of	  the	  drawer	  and	  then	  easily	  pulled	  open	  the	  drawer.	  	  
1.3.3	  Test:	  Phase	  3.	  The	  test	  phase	  was	  the	  same	  for	  all	  groups.	  E1	  told	  the	  child	  it	  was	  “your	  turn	  now”	  and	  asked	  the	  children	  to	  open	  the	  third	  container.	  The	  experimental	  question	  was	  whether	  children	  imitated	  the	  specific	  novel	  act	  that	  had	  been	  shown	  to	  them	  in	  the	  demonstration	  period	  (slid	  the	  switch	  or	  toggled	  the	  lever).	  The	  response	  period	  was	  defined	  as	  from	  the	  time	  the	  adult	  closed	  the	  second	  drawer	  or	  box	  until	  the	  child	  opened	  the	  third.	  No	  specific	  time	  limit	  was	  used,	  and	  all	  children	  achieved	  this	  end	  of	  opening	  the	  third	  drawer.	  After	  the	  children	  completed	  the	  three	  phases	  with	  the	  first	  set	  of	  containers,	  the	  second	  set	  was	  introduced	  (“I	  have	  some	  more	  toys	  to	  play	  with.”),	  and	  the	  procedure	  was	  repeated	  with	  the	  second	  set	  of	  stimuli.	  (In	  most	  cases,	  the	  child	  returned	  the	  toy	  to	  the	  container	  at	  the	  end	  of	  each	  phase.	  In	  rare	  cases	  when	  the	  child	  was	  bored	  or	  unresponsive,	  E1	  returned	  the	  toy.)	  	  
1.4	  Scoring	  and	  Dependent	  Measures	  Research	  assistants,	  blind	  to	  experimental	  group,	  scored	  the	  children’s	  production	  of	  the	  distinctive	  means	  demonstrated	  by	  E1—	  either	  sliding	  the	  switch	  or	  flipping	  the	  toggle.	  Whether	  the	  child	  produced	  the	  target	  act	  during	  the	  response	  period	  for	  each	  trial	  was	  scored	  from	  video	  using	  a	  dichotomous	  yes/no	  measure.	  Children	  were	  credited	  with	  a	  “yes”	  if	  they	  were	  judged	  to	  have	  intentionally	  manipulated	  the	  switch	  or	  toggle	  in	  the	  way	  the	  adult	  did	  before	  attempting	  to	  open	  the	  container.	  Each	  child	  received	  a	  target	  act	  score	  of	  0,	  1,	  or	  2	  depending	  on	  the	  number	  of	  trials	  on	  which	  they	  produced	  the	  target	  act.	  For	  those	  children	  in	  the	  self-­‐experience	  groups,	  it	  was	  also	  possible	  to	  tally	  the	  target	  act	  measure	  during	  their	  initial	  prior	  experience	  phase	  (Phase	  1),	  because	  the	  children	  were	  given	  hands-­‐on	  experience	  in	  this	  group	  prior	  to	  seeing	  the	  adult	  demonstration.	  A	  second	  scorer,	  also	  kept	  blind	  to	  the	  children’s	  experimental	  group,	  coded	  a	  randomly	  chosen	  25%	  of	  the	  participants’	  trials.	  Agreement	  was	  100%,	  yielding	  a	  kappa	  of	  1.0.	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2.	  Results	  Preliminary	  analyses	  showed	  no	  significant	  effects	  of	  stimuli	  (boxes	  versus	  drawers),	  trial	  (1st	  or	  2nd),	  or	  gender	  on	  the	  target	  act	  score;	  we	  collapsed	  across	  these	  factors	  for	  subsequent	  analyses.	  
2.1	  Manipulation	  Check:	  Initial	  Self-­Experience	  	  We	  first	  analyzed	  the	  behavior	  of	  the	  children	  in	  the	  self-­‐experience	  group	  during	  their	  initial,	  Phase-­‐1	  experience.	  As	  expected,	  the	  children	  in	  the	  difficult	  group	  were	  more	  likely	  to	  struggle	  to	  complete	  the	  opening,	  confirming	  that	  our	  experimental	  manipulation	  was	  working:	  Even	  though	  all	  children	  achieved	  the	  outcome	  of	  retrieving	  the	  toy	  from	  the	  first	  box	  (or	  drawer),	  children	  in	  the	  difficult	  group	  took	  longer	  on	  average	  to	  complete	  the	  openings,	  as	  expected,	  because	  the	  container	  was	  jammed	  (difficult	  M	  =	  10.51s,	  SD	  =	  4.97,	  easy	  M	  =	  1.50s,	  SD	  =	  1.00)	  t(38)	  =	  7.95,	  p	  <	  .0001,	  d	  =	  2.58.	  	  During	  this	  baseline	  initial	  experience,	  children’s	  rates	  of	  target	  act	  production	  (manipulating	  the	  switch	  or	  toggle)	  were	  low	  (M	  =	  .40,	  SD	  =	  .67),	  as	  expected;	  and	  there	  was	  no	  significant	  difference	  between	  the	  easy	  and	  difficult	  groups,	  p	  >	  .05,	  (Mann-­‐Whitney	  
U	  test).	  
2.2	  Test	  Trials:	  Assessment	  of	  Imitation	  
2.2.1	  Effects	  as	  a	  function	  of	  experimental	  group.	  As	  predicted,	  children	  who	  were	  randomly	  assigned	  to	  the	  difficult	  groups	  (whether	  self	  or	  other)	  produced	  significantly	  more	  target	  acts	  during	  test	  (M	  =	  1.28,	  mean	  rank	  =	  48.13)	  than	  were	  children	  who	  were	  randomly	  assigned	  to	  the	  easy	  experience	  group	  (M	  =	  .68,	  mean	  rank	  =	  32.88),	  Mann-­‐Whitney	  U	  =	  495.0,	  p	  =	  .002,	  r	  =	  .35).	  These	  results	  indicate	  that	  the	  children’s	  ultimate	  imitation	  of	  the	  adult’s	  demonstration	  was	  influenced	  by	  the	  type	  of	  experience	  they	  or	  another	  person	  initially	  had	  with	  the	  task.	  A	  more	  detailed	  examination	  of	  these	  overall	  results	  (see	  Figure	  2)	  shows	  that	  children	  in	  the	  self-­‐difficult	  group	  (M	  =	  1.10,	  mean	  rank	  =	  25.05)	  were	  significantly	  more	  likely	  to	  produce	  the	  target	  acts	  than	  were	  children	  in	  the	  self-­‐easy	  group	  (M	  =	  .40,	  mean	  rank	  =	  15.95),	  U	  =	  109.0,	  p	  =	  .01,	  r	  =	  .42.	  Consistent	  with	  this,	  children	  in	  the	  other-­‐difficult	  group	  (M	  =	  1.45,	  mean	  rank	  =	  23.83)	  were	  more	  likely	  to	  produce	  the	  target	  acts	  than	  were	  children	  in	  the	  other-­‐easy	  group,	  though	  this	  difference	  was	  not	  statistically	  significant	  (M	  =	  .95,	  mean	  rank	  =	  17.18),	  U	  =	  133.5,	  p	  =	  .07,	  r	  =	  .31	  (this	  and	  other	  tests	  are	  reported	  as	  2-­‐tailed	  values).	  Overall,	  there	  was	  also	  a	  difference	  in	  target	  act	  production	  during	  the	  test	  phase	  depending	  on	  the	  person	  who	  produced	  the	  motor	  experience	  (self	  or	  other)	  in	  the	  initial	  phase	  of	  the	  experiment.	  Regardless	  of	  ease	  or	  difficulty,	  those	  children	  who	  saw	  E2	  act	  on	  the	  box	  (or	  drawer)	  during	  the	  initial	  phase	  (and	  thus	  saw	  both	  E1	  and	  E2	  act)	  were	  more	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likely	  to	  produce	  the	  target	  acts	  (M	  =	  1.20,	  mean	  rank	  =	  46.23)	  than	  were	  children	  who	  had	  the	  initial	  experience	  with	  the	  task	  themselves	  (M	  =	  .75,	  mean	  rank	  =	  34.78);	  U	  	  =	  571.0,	  p	  =	  .02,	  r	  =	  .26.	  	  
	  
Figure	  2.	  	  Mean	  number	  of	  target	  acts	  produced	  (plus	  and	  minus	  standard	  error)	  when	  the	  children	  either	  had	  a	  difficult	  or	  easy	  experience	  themselves	  or	  witnessed	  another	  person	  have	  a	  difficult	  or	  easy	  experience.	  	  
2.2.2	  Effects	  as	  a	  function	  of	  trial	  phase.	  Next,	  we	  consider	  the	  within-­‐subject	  change	  in	  children’s	  target	  act	  production	  during	  the	  test	  phase	  (Phase	  3;	  see	  Methods)	  as	  compared	  to	  during	  their	  initial	  experience	  phase	  (Phase	  1)	  before	  children	  had	  seen	  the	  target	  demonstration.	  In	  the	  self-­‐experience	  group,	  each	  child	  can	  be	  used	  as	  his	  or	  her	  own	  control,	  since	  children	  at	  first	  had	  a	  chance	  to	  manipulate	  the	  objects	  themselves	  before	  the	  test.	  A	  Wilcoxon	  signed-­‐ranks	  test	  shows	  that	  children	  produced	  significantly	  more	  target	  acts	  in	  the	  test	  phase	  than	  in	  Phase	  1	  before	  they	  had	  seen	  the	  target-­‐act	  demonstration,	  z	  =	  2.52,	  p	  =	  .01,	  r	  =	  .40.	  If	  we	  further	  sub-­‐divide	  this	  self-­‐experience	  group	  (resulting	  in	  a	  smaller	  n	  for	  each	  subdivision),	  we	  find	  that	  this	  difference	  also	  approached	  significance	  in	  both	  of	  the	  subgroups	  taken	  alone	  (easy:	  z	  =	  1.89,	  p	  =	  .06,	  r	  =	  .42	  and	  difficult:	  z	  =	  1.83,	  p	  =	  .07,	  r	  =	  .41).	  Using	  a	  between-­‐subjects(independent	  group)	  comparison,	  there	  is	  also	  converging	  evidence	  of	  the	  same	  point.	  Children	  in	  the	  other-­‐experience	  group	  also	  showed	  significantly	  more	  target	  acts	  in	  the	  test	  phase	  (M	  =	  1.20,	  mean	  rank	  =	  50.4)	  than	  did	  the	  independent	  group	  of	  children	  in	  the	  self-­‐experience	  group	  during	  Phase	  1	  who	  had	  not	  seen	  the	  target	  act	  demonstrated	  (M	  =	  .40,	  mean	  rank	  =	  30.6),	  Mann-­‐Whitney	  U	  =	  404.0,	  p	  <	  .001,	  r	  =	  .46.	  If	  we	  further	  sub-­‐divide	  this	  more	  finely,	  the	  effects	  remain	  unchanged:	  This	  difference	  was	  significant	  for	  independent	  group	  comparisons	  of	  the	  other-­‐easy	  group	  at	  test	  (versus	  self-­‐easy	  Phase	  1),	  U	  =	  91.0,	  p	  =	  .003,	  r	  =	  .53;	  and	  the	  other-­‐difficult	  group	  at	  test	  (versus	  self-­‐difficult	  Phase	  1),	  U	  =	  103.5,	  p	  =	  .008,	  r	  =	  .44.	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3.	  General	  Discussion	  We	  tested	  whether	  prior	  experience	  obtained	  via	  both	  first-­‐person	  and	  third-­‐person	  channels	  influences	  36-­‐month-­‐olds’	  imitation	  of	  a	  new	  adult.	  We	  systematically	  varied	  whether	  the	  children	  themselves,	  or	  an	  adult	  they	  observed,	  had	  a	  difficult	  or	  easy	  experience	  completing	  the	  task.	  Following	  this,	  the	  children	  always	  saw	  a	  different	  adult	  use	  a	  distinctive	  means	  (sliding	  a	  switch	  or	  flipping	  a	  toggle)	  before	  easily	  achieving	  the	  goal.	  In	  those	  cases	  where	  the	  initial	  experience	  was	  difficult,	  the	  children	  were	  significantly	  more	  likely	  to	  imitate	  the	  distinctive	  means	  used	  by	  the	  adult	  than	  when	  the	  experience	  was	  easy.	  	  	  The	  experimental	  procedure	  isolates	  children’s	  prior	  experience	  (whether	  first-­‐hand	  or	  through	  observation	  of	  the	  acts	  of	  others)	  as	  the	  critical	  factor:	  Children	  in	  all	  groups	  saw	  the	  same	  demonstration	  during	  the	  second	  phase	  of	  the	  experiment	  –	  an	  adult	  drew	  the	  children’s	  attention,	  produced	  the	  target	  act	  with	  a	  purposeful	  manner,	  and	  achieved	  the	  goal.	  Only	  the	  experience	  in	  the	  first	  phase	  of	  the	  experiment	  varied.	  The	  results	  showed	  that	  children	  were	  more	  likely	  to	  adopt	  and	  imitate	  the	  adult’s	  means	  if	  they	  either	  had	  themselves,	  or	  witnessed	  another	  having,	  a	  difficult	  time	  reaching	  the	  goal	  compared	  to	  if	  the	  initial	  experience	  was	  easy.	  Although	  hands-­‐on	  experience	  may	  promote	  learning	  in	  some	  cases	  (e.g.,	  Williamson	  et	  al.,	  2008),	  the	  current	  results	  show	  that	  by	  36	  months	  of	  age	  children	  are	  not	  limited	  to	  evaluating	  efficacy	  from	  their	  own	  experiences.	  They	  are	  also	  able	  to	  use	  others’	  efficacy	  to	  guide	  their	  imitation	  of	  goal-­‐directed	  causal	  acts.	   There	  may,	  however,	  be	  some	  privilege	  to	  children’s	  own	  hands-­‐on	  experiences:	  Children	  in	  the	  self-­‐experience	  groups	  overall	  (combining	  easy	  and	  difficult)	  were	  less	  likely	  to	  imitate	  the	  target	  acts	  than	  were	  children	  in	  the	  other-­‐experience	  groups	  (combining	  easy	  and	  difficult).	  The	  children’s	  own	  motor	  experience	  with	  successfully	  completing	  the	  task,	  whether	  easily	  or	  with	  difficulty,	  may	  have	  led	  to	  reduced	  imitation	  of	  the	  model’s	  behaviors,	  relative	  to	  the	  children	  who	  only	  observed	  another	  complete	  the	  task.	  Alternatively,	  the	  high	  levels	  of	  imitation	  in	  the	  other-­‐experience	  groups	  might	  be	  due	  to	  children	  interpreting	  the	  second	  actor’s	  switch	  in	  means	  from	  what	  the	  first	  actor	  did	  as	  a	  correction.	  The	  change	  might	  indicate	  that	  the	  initial	  strategy	  is	  not	  efficient	  or	  socially/culturally	  desirable.	  An	  interesting	  follow-­‐up	  to	  this	  research	  would	  be	  to	  investigate	  whether	  children	  would	  be	  likely	  to	  imitate	  the	  second	  adult	  after	  seeing	  contrasting	  demonstrations	  even	  if	  information	  about	  efficacy	  was	  not	  shown.	  Young	  children’s	  consideration	  of	  prior	  efficacy	  has	  the	  potential	  to	  improve	  their	  social	  learning	  (Boyd	  &	  Richerson,	  1985;	  Laland,	  2004;	  Williamson	  et	  al.,	  2008).	  Other	  studies	  using	  different	  paradigms	  have	  produced	  results	  that	  are	  broadly	  compatible	  with	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the	  current	  ones.	  Research	  shows	  that	  preschoolers	  take	  others’	  accuracy	  or	  trustworthiness	  into	  account	  when	  acquiring	  new	  words	  (e.g.,	  Birch,	  Vauthier,	  &	  Bloom,	  2008;	  Koenig,	  Clément,	  &	  Harris,	  2004;	  Jaswal	  &	  Neely,	  2006).	  Young	  children	  also	  modify	  their	  approach	  to	  a	  problem	  depending	  on	  whether	  the	  model	  they	  see	  succeeds	  or	  fails	  in	  achieving	  the	  outcome	  (Want	  &	  Harris,	  2001;	  see	  also,	  Nielsen,	  2006).	  The	  current	  experiments	  extend	  this	  by	  suggesting	  that	  young	  children	  also	  track	  the	  relative	  efficacy	  of	  
another	  person’s	  specific	  means	  even	  when	  two	  different	  means	  are	  shown	  to	  be	  successful	  –	  i.e.,	  whether	  they	  had	  a	  difficult	  or	  easy	  time	  achieving	  a	  goal	  using	  a	  particular	  technique.	  This	  relative	  efficacy	  of	  the	  act	  influences	  their	  tendency	  to	  adopt	  and	  imitate	  the	  adult’s	  act.	  When	  the	  first	  adult	  was	  seen	  to	  have	  a	  difficult	  experience	  reaching	  an	  outcome,	  children	  had	  an	  increased	  tendency	  to	  imitate	  a	  second	  actor’s	  more	  efficacious	  technique	  relative	  to	  when	  the	  first	  actor	  completed	  the	  task	  easily.	  Neither	  actors’	  behaviors	  were	  unsuccessful;	  others’	  relative	  efficacy	  alone	  was	  sufficient	  to	  influence	  children’s	  imitation.	  	  The	  current	  findings	  fit	  with	  the	  idea	  that	  young	  children’s	  imitative	  learning	  can	  be	  regulated	  and	  selective	  	  and	  is	  not	  limited	  to	  blind,	  automatic,	  or	  compulsory	  copying.	  The	  children	  in	  this	  experiment	  chose	  to	  imitate	  when	  it	  was	  efficacious	  to	  do	  so:	  When	  they	  themselves,	  or	  another	  person,	  had	  difficulty	  using	  a	  straightforward	  option,	  children	  rapidly	  picked	  up	  the	  novel	  technique	  and	  imitated	  it.	  In	  contrast,	  when	  the	  task	  was	  easy	  to	  complete	  without	  the	  adult’s	  novel	  means,	  children	  were	  less	  likely	  to	  adopt	  them.	  Information	  about	  a	  task	  gained	  through	  prior	  experiences	  —whether	  hands-­‐on	  or	  simply	  observational	  experience—may	  be	  one	  factor	  that	  helps	  children	  regulate	  their	  behavior	  (including	  over-­‐imitation)	  as	  they	  choose	  who,	  what,	  and	  when	  to	  imitate.	  The	  children	  in	  this	  experiment	  treated	  prior	  “experience”	  rather	  abstractly	  and	  weighed	  both	  their	  own	  and	  others’	  experiences	  when	  choosing	  to	  imitate.
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